Dmytro YEFREMOV, PhD in Economics,
the Board Member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists

Policy comment

Acknowledgements

This policy comment is based on ideas and perspectives expressed during the roundtable discussion by Kaiser Kuo (moderator, Sinica Podcast), Vita Golod (Board Member, Ukrainian Association of Sinologists), Finbarr Bermingham (Europe Correspondent, South China Morning Post), David Firestein (President and CEO, George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations), Ning Leng (Assistant Professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University), Rebecca Kohler (Project Director, SAFEMed, Ukraine, USAID-funded project)

Executive Summary

• The Trump administration’s recalibrated foreign policy toward Ukraine has deprioritized alliances and development aid, creating diplomatic uncertainty and exposing Ukraine to strategic vulnerability. Kyiv now faces the risk of symbolic conflict resolution without firm guarantees of sovereignty.
• The dismantling of USAID and U.S. retreat from global development aid have opened a geopolitical vacuum that China is actively working to fill, particularly through infrastructure investment and post-war reconstruction efforts. This shift reshapes the global aid landscape, particularly in the Global South.
• Europe is reassessing its strategic posture in response to U.S. unreliability, with growing calls for “strategic autonomy.” However, the EU’s capacity to substitute U.S. leadership—especially in Ukraine’s defense and recovery—remains limited and fragmented, posing new challenges to transatlantic unity.

1. U.S. Foreign Policy towards Ukraine and China’s Recalibration

The issue. The Donald J. Trump “America First” doctrine has been operationalized into a foreign policy approach that deprioritizes global alliances, multilateral frameworks, and sustained development assistance. Nowhere is this realignment more visible—or more consequential—than in the case of Ukraine.

The recalibration of U.S. policy under Trump 2.0 has introduced acute uncertainty into global crisis management, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine. The Trump administration’s inclination to pressure Ukraine rather than Russia, its dismantling of USAID infrastructure, and its preference for direct engagement with Moscow have disrupted the diplomatic status quo. These changes have triggered a wave of strategic adaptation in Kyiv, European capitals, and Beijing, all of whom now face the challenge of navigating a conflict without the once-assured leadership of the United States.

Analysis. The Trump administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine departs fundamentally from the bipartisan consensus that defined previous U.S. strategies. Rather than treating Ukraine as a frontline state in the defense of liberal democratic order, the new administration appears inclined to regard Ukraine as a burden to be managed—or a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow. As highlighted by several panelists, Trump’s public and private actions suggest an openness to peace deals negotiated with minimal Ukrainian input, and with strategic optics designed for a domestic political audience rather than long-term stability in Eastern Europe.

On the ground in Kyiv, this policy shift has exacerbated the sense of vulnerability. The Ukrainian leadership faces the uncomfortable reality that the current U.S. administration may prioritize symbolic conflict resolution over substantive guarantees of sovereignty. As noted by Vita Golod, this has produced a “painful possibility” that Trump might simply walk away, leaving Ukraine exposed. The perceived imbalance—where pressure is applied to the victim rather than the aggressor—has echoes of China’s own proposals for Ukraine, though even Beijing has maintained formal rhetorical support for Ukrainian territorial integrity.

European governments, particularly those in Brussels and the Baltic region, initially responded to the Trump administration’s posture with efforts to preserve U.S. involvement by invoking deterrence logic vis-à-vis China. As Finbarr Bermingham noted, European leaders argued that U.S. disengagement in Ukraine could embolden China to act against Taiwan. However, this line of argument has proven largely ineffective in influencing Trump, who has pursued ad hoc diplomacy with Putin regardless of allied concerns. This has accelerated the push for European “strategic autonomy”—long advocated by France but now gaining traction even among traditionally pro-U.S. actors like Lithuania.

In Beijing, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from multilateral leadership—particularly in areas such as foreign aid—has been read as both an opportunity and a complication. As Ning Leng observed, China is urgently seeking to expand its global economic footprint, partly to offset domestic economic slowdowns and geopolitical decoupling with the U.S. While China continues to avoid direct involvement in the Russian aggressive war against Ukraine, it actively positions itself as a post-war reconstruction partner, especially for countries in the Global South. At the same time, its muted humanitarian engagement and equivocal stance on Russia’s aggression have limited its legitimacy as a conflict mediator. As Vita Golod noted, political and public engagement between Ukraine and China—as well as participation by Chinese companies in Ukraine’s ongoing recovery efforts—remains almost invisible, as China maintains a cautious posture in its dealings with Ukraine.

The dismantling of USAID, as described by Rebecca Kohler and David Firestein, has had profound consequences not only for Ukraine’s resistance and reconstruction but for global development as a whole. The collapse of U.S. aid infrastructure eliminates a vital channel through which Washington projected soft power and supported stability. For Kyiv, the implications are immediate: shuttered clinics, disrupted pharmaceutical supply chains, and diminished technical assistance—all of which reinforce the perception that the U.S. is withdrawing not just from Ukraine, but from its broader international commitments.

2. U.S. Retrenchment, Strategic Vacuum and a Shifting Global Aid Landscape

The issue. The return of President Trump has triggered a sweeping overhaul of U.S. foreign aid infrastructure, signaling a broader shift in how Washington defines its global role. The restructuring is centered on the dismantling of USAID. Although a few legacy programs survive, the move effectively ends America’s role as a central development partner across large parts of the Global South.

This U.S. retrenchment from global development aid under Trump 2.0 has created a vacuum that risks undermining fragile governance, economic resilience, and health systems in aid-dependent countries. More importantly, it opens the door for alternative powers—most notably China—to step in and redefine the norms and structures of global development.

Analysis. In countries like Ukraine, which had become a significant recipient of USAID assistance—accounting for nearly 25% of the agency’s global budget over the past three years—the immediate effects are visible and acute. As Rebecca Kohler noted, the dismantling of USAID has disrupted health supply chains, shuttered clinics, and forced implementing partners to scramble for alternative financing. These are not merely technical setbacks; they represent a rupture in a long-standing development model that also served as a mechanism for Western influence and values promotion.

Organizations once built as “USAID engines” are now accelerating efforts to diversify funding streams and engage new donors, a process already underway but now rapidly intensified. While this may result in more agile and adaptive models of aid delivery, it also creates an opening for China’s alternative vision of development assistance to expand its appeal—particularly in regions where Western aid is seen as conditional, political, or transactional.

China, meanwhile, is recalibrating its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to better align with fiscal realities and geopolitical sensitivities. As Ning Leng pointed out, the BRI is now pivoting toward “small and beautiful” projects—smaller-scale, higher-quality, and sometimes multilateral in structure. While China’s domestic debt pressures have driven this change, the geopolitical opportunity presented by U.S. withdrawal is unmistakable. In this environment, Beijing is already expressing interest in participating in post-war reconstruction efforts in Ukraine—not through humanitarian assistance, which remains minimal, but through economic engagement via infrastructure and logistics partnerships. However, as Vita Golod pointed out, Ukraine has officially been a participant in the BRI since 2017, but its involvement has remained limited. The future of the BRI in Ukraine is uncertain and will largely depend on the broader strategic direction of the European Union’s policy toward China.

Such a shift is not limited to Ukraine. Across much of the Global South, China is likely to benefit from reduced Western competition for development influence. The strategic implication is clear: where U.S. disengagement was once unthinkable, it is now being normalized, and the symbolism of this retreat may carry as much weight as the material consequences. As David Firestein argued, the clinking of champagne glasses in Beijing is not just a metaphor—it reflects a real geopolitical opportunity being seized amid American withdrawal.

3. European Strategic Reassessment: Between Fragmentation and Realignment

The issue. The re-election of Donald Trump has reignited transatlantic uncertainty, with implications that extend far beyond U.S.-EU trade or diplomacy. European governments are once again confronted with the reality of a U.S. administration that exhibits transactional, often unpredictable, foreign policy behavior. This rupture has accelerated long-standing debates in Brussels and key European capitals over “strategic autonomy”—Europe’s ability to act independently of U.S. leadership in matters of defense, economic resilience, and global engagement.

European ambitions for strategic autonomy now intersect directly with the fate of Ukraine, which has long relied on Washington for military and political support. If transatlantic fragmentation continues and Europe becomes solely responsible for Ukraine’s long-term security, reconstruction, and deterrence posture, critical questions emerge: Can the EU provide sustained support at the necessary scale? Will a recalibrated European approach command political consensus across member states? And how might this shift be exploited by other actors, including China and Russia?

Analysis. The push for European strategic autonomy has intensified in response to growing doubts about the reliability of the United States. As David Firestein observed, the world—including America’s closest allies—is adjusting to the realization that Trump’s re-election is not an anomaly, but rather a symptom of a deeper structural shift in U.S. politics.

In response, European states are recalibrating. As Finbarr Bermingham reported from Brussels, business lobbies and industrial groups in Germany and Central Europe are pushing back against overregulation and geopolitical decoupling—especially when such measures stemmed from Biden-era cooperation with Washington. This business-driven backlash has already derailed or delayed several EU initiatives tied to the U.S. economic security agenda, including outbound investment screening and export controls. Although this suggests divergence between Brussels and Washington, it also reveals the EU’s internal fragmentation: economic interests remain heavily tied to China, even as political discourse grows more security-oriented.

For Ukraine, these developments are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Rebecca Kohler highlighted that the EU has indeed stepped up—particularly in the health and reconstruction sectors—since the beginning of accession talks. On the other hand, Kohler cautioned that similar support cannot be expected globally, as European donors face their own domestic constraints and funding reductions. This reinforces a core tension: Europe may aspire to strategic autonomy, but its capacity to fully substitute for U.S. power—especially in military and diplomatic terms—remains limited. She also observed that the U.S. appears to be shifting toward a China-style model of foreign engagement. While American foreign assistance has always carried political motivations, it is now increasingly taking the form of foreign investment aligned with ideological objectives, rather than following the traditional model rooted in the promotion of democratic values.

Furthermore, as Finbarr Bermingham noted, the upcoming EU-China summit (July 2025) will be shaped by the broader transatlantic dynamic. If Trump continues to sideline European allies or further abandons support for Ukraine, there may be greater temptation in Brussels to seek limited rapprochement with Beijing—even if structural mistrust and the shadow of Russia’s war persist. Such an opening, however cautious, could complicate Ukraine’s alignment with the West and test the red lines of its political leadership, which has historically resisted deeper integration into Chinese-led initiatives.

Policy Recommendations

1. The Ukrainian government should deepen bilateral coordination with key EU states to ensure continuity in financial, technical, and defense support, anticipating potential U.S. withdrawal or conditional engagement.
2. Ukrainian diplomacy should prioritize integration into multilateral reconstruction frameworks with both Western and alternative donors by building strategic partnerships at national and regional levels. At the same time, Ukraine should publicly clarify its official stance on cooperation with China’s BRI, ensuring that any engagement aligns with national interests and complies with EU-aligned aid screening and transparency standards.
3. Ukraine and its European partners should jointly advocate for maintaining U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s security and reconstruction through public diplomacy, bipartisan engagement in Washington, and strategic alignment with NATO and the G7.

This policy comment is the result of the first open discussion initiated by the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies (CSEEES) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, held on the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China. The event was co-organized in partnership with the Sinica Podcast, the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine), the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, and the A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.