Questions for Prasenjit Duara, Oscar Tang Professor of East Asian Studies, Director of the Asia Pacific Studies Institute (APSI), and President of the Association for Asian Studies (2019–20), Department of History, Duke University.

Prepared by Vita Golod, Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, June 24, 2025.

I. Constructing History and Legitimizing Power

Vita Golod (V.G.): Your book Rescuing History from the Nation (1995) felt strikingly relevant when I revisited it in 2024. In particular, your critique of how modern states construct selective historical narratives to legitimize authority resonated deeply with current developments in Xi Jinping’s China. Today’s leadership places strong emphasis on civilizational continuity and national unity, often promoting a homogenized identity that marginalizes or erases the cultural heritage of ethnic minorities. From your perspective, does nationalism—grounded in a carefully curated historical memory—still function today as a core instrument of Chinese state power?

Prasenjit Duara (P.D.): Yes, it does. But it is not only about invoking past glories; it also positions China as the leader of a new, world-saving ideology—one that combines Marxist notions of progress with the vision of an ecological civilization.

V.G.: How would you define modern Chinese nationalism in the Xi Jinping era, particularly in relation to the concept of the ‘Chinese nation’? To what extent is it a continuation of earlier nation-building efforts, and in what ways has it evolved into a distinct ideological project? Do you agree with the view that China’s nation-building remains an unfinished project—and if so, what factors have prevented its full consolidation?

P.D.: The most distinctive feature is the intensification of China’s global leadership ambitions, especially toward the Global South—something not seen since the Maoist era. Nation-building is never truly finished; there are always new challenges. As Renan said, the nation is a “daily plebiscite,” whether expressed through the voices of minorities or the mobilization of military masses.

V.G.: Xi Jinping’s emphasis on “5,000 years of Chinese civilization” and the revival of Confucian traditions appears to reflect a form of civilizational nationalism, rather than purely civic or ethnic nationalism. Can civilizational nationalism provide sustainable legitimacy in a multiethnic state, or does it inherently risk provoking resistance—especially from minority groups whose histories and identities are excluded from the dominant narrative?

P.D.: I think civilizational nationalism in China is less about internal ethnic unification—since that is managed through other instruments such as surveillance, repression, and education—than about projecting global leadership. It is aimed both at the Chinese themselves and at others, especially in the Global South.

V.G.: Even though Chinese nationalism is increasingly framed in civilizational terms, it still appears deeply rooted in a Han-centric identity. Do you agree with this framing? If so, does the structure of such nationalism inevitably marginalize minority identities, even when it uses the language of unity and harmony? Do you see similar patterns in other multiethnic states, or is there something uniquely Chinese about this model?

P.D.: I definitely agree that it is Han-centric. What makes China distinctive is the CCP’s capacity to penetrate society in ways that are more far-reaching than other multiethnic states. For example, Russia lost this kind of penetrative power in the 1980s. In India, attempts at national integration through Hindutva encounter strong resistance from regional powers.

II. Control and the Margins of the Nation

V.G.: Given your analysis of nationalism as a historical project, how do you interpret the resurgence of Han chauvinism under Xi Jinping? Is it a failure of inclusive nationalism—or an intentional shift toward an ethnonationalist model cloaked in civilizational rhetoric?

P.D.: As suggested above, it is more the latter than the former.

V.G.: In Rescuing History from the Nation, you discussed how early 20th-century China saw alternative political imaginations—religious pluralism, federalism, and local autonomies—eventually marginalized. Today, those alternatives are not only marginalized but criminalized. How do you interpret this shift under Xi Jinping? Is this simply authoritarianism, or does it reflect deeper traditions within China’s nation-building history?

Prasenjit Duara: The centralizing tradition in China is deeply historical. Since the Tang dynasty, all major regional satraps have sought to control the center.

V.G.: In your book, you argued that China’s modern nationhood was shaped in part by 19th-century racial and civilizational hierarchies. Do you see traces of that legacy in today’s nation-building under Xi Jinping—particularly in policies that cast ethnic minorities as culturally “backward” or in need of “modernization”?

P.D.: Yes, and it remains an important aspect—not only domestically but also in people-to-people interactions and in the practices of private Chinese businesses in Belt and Road countries.

V.G.: How would you interpret the paradox of Chinese multiculturalism—where ethnic cultures are publicly curated and celebrated in state museums and festivals, yet political autonomy and lived diversity are increasingly suppressed? Is this a continuation of the “body without organs” metaphor that Dru Gladney described, or does it represent a more advanced stage of ideological control?

P.D.: In Guattari’s formulation, the “body without organs” suggests a positive potential for multiple capacities, but in Dru Gladney’s usage it highlights the negative—suppressing real difference. I think the Party-state has moved beyond this to exercising digital power: not only shaping behavior through surveillance but also through the positive and negative incentives of the Social Credit System. Capitalism, of course, uses similar mechanisms for consumer guidance.

V.G.: Given your work on the limits of nationalist projects, do you think China’s top-down effort to forge a singular “Chinese nation”—especially through second-generation ethnic policy—risks undermining its own goals by deepening alienation among minorities? As a historian, when do you think nation-building becomes counterproductive rather than integrative?

P.D.: Xi’s crackdown came in response to the lack of success with second-generation minorities—especially Uyghurs, Mongols, and Tibetans—as China globalized. Now it relies largely on eliminating cultural memory through surveillance, repression, and pedagogy. If the economic system enters a prolonged crisis, the CCP will intensify both digital and physical power. Yet cultural memory of difference—even if not outright resistance—cannot be entirely obliterated in an era of unavoidable global penetration.

V.G.: You have written about how the suppression of pluralist alternatives helped centralize the modern Chinese state. In today’s context—where ethnic nationalism is criminalized or heavily controlled—do you see any space for non-Han narratives to persist or evolve within the current Chinese nation-state framework?

P.D.: It remains a nation-state within a globalized framework, even with the firewall.

III. The Crisis of Representation

V.G.: How do you interpret Uyghur nationalism within the broader context of China’s nation-building project? Do you see it as one of the direct challenges to the CCP’s vision of a unified “Chinese nation,” or as a symptom of the internal contradictions within that vision?

P.D.: It is both. Nationalism tends to favor the majority by its very structure of defining self and other, so Uyghur nationalism simultaneously exposes the contradictions of the CCP’s project and challenges its authority.

V.G.: Given the divergence between Uyghur experiences inside China and those in the diaspora, do you believe Uyghur nationalism today still represents a coherent collective identity? Or is it fragmenting under state repression and geopolitical dispersion? How does this relate to your broader understanding of identity formation under state power?

P.D.: China’s expanding forms of control over global populations—especially dissenting and ethnic diasporas—have intensified precisely because of this externalization through global channels. Its immense economic and digital power now combines global leadership claims with transnational repression. This has been most evident, and most successful, in its relationship with Turkey.

V.G.: Your work emphasizes how nationalist states selectively manage identity through historical framing and cultural control. In the Chinese context, the state’s approach to assimilation appears highly differentiated: while Uyghurs face harsh securitization and forced assimilation, groups like the Hui experience conditional tolerance, and the Korean Chinese enjoy relative cultural autonomy. What do you think drives this hierarchy of treatment among ethnic minorities? Is it primarily shaped by perceived security threats, religious difference, or political utility—and what does this reveal about the CCP’s underlying logic of national integration?

P.D.: All three factors play a role. Although nationalism is inherently majoritarian, it also differentiates the “internal other” according to considerations of security threat, religious difference, and political utility.

IV. Global Nationalisms

V.G.: Nationalism has resurged globally in recent years, taking different forms depending on historical and political context. The “America First” doctrine is a prominent example of this trend. In your view, does the rise of nationalist ideologies pose a fundamental threat to global cooperation, international norms, and long-term stability?

P.D.: I think the world is now far too deeply interdependent—especially through global supply chains—for nationalism to completely unravel cooperation. What we may see instead is the emergence of regional dependencies, where blocs consolidate around key powers. Middle powers, in turn, will try to gain advantage by engaging with two or more sides. It remains highly improbable that the developed West can restore large numbers of basic working-class jobs; instead, economies will continue to depend more on the service sector—and even many of those jobs can often be outsourced.

V.G.: We often hear nationalism described in terms of “good” and “bad.” Ukrainian nationalism is frequently portrayed as “good”—centered on democratic self-determination and resistance to foreign aggression—while Russian nationalism is framed as “bad,” rooted in imperial ambition and exclusion. How useful do you find this binary? Does it help us understand current nationalist movements, or does it obscure deeper historical and geopolitical dynamics?

P.D.: Traditionally, the discussion was framed as civic (or inclusive) nationalism versus ethnic (or racist) nationalism. But I have always argued that civic nationalism can, under the right—or wrong—circumstances, evolve into ethnic or religious nationalism, as we see in some cases today. I think it is more useful to distinguish between aggressive or imperialistic nationalism and defensive or reflexive nationalism. Reflexive nationalism can be both a justified reaction and a thoughtful stance. At this moment, I would place Ukraine in the latter category. But all nationalisms, depending on circumstances, have the potential to shift.