Dmytro YEFREMOV, PhD in Economics,
the Board Member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists

Acknowledgements

This policy comment is based on ideas and perspectives expressed during the roundtable discussion by Kaiser Kuo (moderator, Sinica Podcast), Ivan Us (National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine), Xu Qinduo (CGTN, Pangoal Institution, China), Jim Mullinax (U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Fellow), and Grzegorz Stec (MERICS, European Union).

Executive Summary

• Critical minerals have become a pivotal element of 21st-century diplomacy, with the U.S., EU, and China pursuing divergent strategies that reflect their respective geopolitical priorities and economic models. Ukraine’s mineral-rich territory has emerged as a strategic bargaining chip amid shifting global alliances and post-war reconstruction efforts.
• The 2025S.-Ukraine mineral agreement, though publicly framed as a partnership, reveals a transactional core. It provides preferential access and legal protections to U.S. investors while lacking enforceable commitments to Ukraine’s reconstruction or strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, the EU’s normative, multilateral approach is being challenged by the bilateral assertiveness of U.S. policy. China, for its part, maintains dominance over global mineral processing but now uses export controls strategically, while projecting an image of non-interference and economic pragmatism.
• Rather than fostering multilateral cooperation, mineral diplomacy is evolving into a system of competing blocs, characterized by exclusionary agreements, geopolitical bargaining, and regulatory asymmetries. Without a framework for inclusive governance, these dynamics threaten to fragment global supply chains and marginalize smaller economies like Ukraine in their own reconstruction processes. 

1. Critical Minerals as a Focal Point for National Security Strategies

The issue. In recent years, critical minerals have emerged as a defining concern in global diplomacy and national security strategies. Their indispensability for advanced technologies—from defense systems to renewable energy infrastructure—has rendered them a focal point of geopolitical maneuvering. For Ukraine, this evolving priority took a dramatic turn in late 2024, as Kyiv sought to reposition itself as a strategic partner for the United States by leveraging its untapped reserves of rare earth elements and other critical raw materials. What began as a calculated response to anticipated shifts in U.S. foreign policy under a new Trump administration quickly developed into a bilateral mineral agreement, framed in Washington as a mutually beneficial “partnership.”

Yet the underlying dynamics of the deal, as well as its implications for transatlantic coordination, remain deeply contested—not only in Kyiv and Washington but also in Brussels. As Europe races to reduce its own dependency on China for critical minerals, the U.S.-Ukraine arrangement has raised concerns about weakening international coordination and whether Ukraine will benefit fairly from reconstruction efforts.

From Kyiv’s (and Brussel’s) standpoint, the partnership was designed not merely to attract Western capital, but to anchor continued U.S. military and political support amid fears of disengagement. However, with embedded privileges for U.S.-backed entities and few institutional safeguards for Ukrainian or European stakeholders, the deal risks becoming a precedent for extractive conditionality rather than post-war recovery justice. Moreover, it highlights an emerging disjuncture in transatlantic priorities, as the European Union’s efforts to diversify its critical mineral supply chains and assert strategic autonomy are potentially sidelined by Washington’s bilateral assertiveness.

Analysis. The origins and evolution of the U.S.-Ukraine mineral deal reveal its “transactional” core. As early as October 2024, in anticipation of Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House, Ukrainian officials recalibrated their foreign policy tactics. With military aid uncertain and European defense capacity limited, Kyiv sought to entice Washington through what Ivan Us described as a “Victory Plan” featuring proposals directly tailored to Trump’s interests—including access to Ukraine’s critical mineral resources. U.S. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a vocal advocate, further embedded this logic by supporting joint exploration efforts as a means to justify continued engagement.

Despite public framing as a strategic partnership, the initial terms of the deal—such as debt conditioning, veto rights over Ukraine’s European integration, and extensive investment privileges for U.S. companies—underscored an imbalance of power. While Kyiv hoped to convert resource cooperation into a shared victory narrative, early drafts of the agreement appeared to position the U.S. as a dominant beneficiary with minimal obligations. It was only through legal pushback and international legal consultation that Ukraine managed to adjust the terms into a more mutually palatable framework.

From a European perspective, as explained by Grzegorz Stec, the agreement is viewed ambivalently. On one hand, it sustains U.S. engagement in Ukraine and, by extension, in European security—a vital consideration given NATO’s recalibrations. On the other, it threatens to marginalize EU initiatives such as the Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to secure diversified, sustainable, and resilient supply chains. Brussels perceives the U.S. approach as both a stabilizing force and a potential economic constraint. Moreover, the exclusion of EU stakeholders from early negotiations has fueled concerns that the U.S. may crowd out European industrial interests in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, setting a precedent for coercive resource diplomacy.

In China the agreement is perceived as part of a broader trend in U.S. economic statecraft aimed at limiting China’s access to strategic resources. This approach is characterized by provisions—often referred to as “poison clauses”—embedded in bilateral trade and investment agreements, which implicitly or explicitly restrict partner countries from engaging with Chinese firms in sensitive sectors such as critical minerals.

2. Geopolitics of Critical Minerals: Divergent Strategies of the U.S., EU, and China

The issue. In the wake of geopolitical realignments and increasing global competition for strategic resources, critical minerals have emerged as key instruments of national power and economic resilience. For countries like Ukraine, endowed with considerable—though largely underexplored—mineral reserves, the post-war reconstruction agenda is becoming tightly interwoven with broader global supply chain politics. The U.S., the EU, and China each approach critical minerals not merely as commodities, but as levers of influence tied to their security doctrines, economic strategies, and normative values.

While Ukraine seeks foreign capital and geopolitical guarantees, the terms and structures of these mineral partnerships risk constraining its sovereignty, long-term policy autonomy, and alignment prospects. The challenge lies in balancing national development needs with competing external expectations—each rooted in distinct visions of global order.

Analysis. While no formal obligations exist, the U.S. has implicitly linked access to Ukrainian mineral resources with ongoing military and economic engagement, raising questions about the transactional nature of its support. The bilateral agreement with Ukraine grants U.S.-backed entities preferential investment rights and seeks to exclude them from future domestic policy changes, raising concerns over democratic sovereignty and regulatory space. As Jim Mullinax described it, the U.S. approach reflects a logic of strategic securitization—prioritizing investor protection, securing preferential access, and limiting involvement of actors considered adversarial, particularly China.

The European Union, by contrast, frames its critical mineral engagement through the lens of “open strategic autonomy.” It emphasizes environmental standards, multilateral coordination, and regulatory frameworks such as the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway initiative. However, as Grzegorz Stec points out, the EU faces limitations in mobilizing rapid investment at the scale offered by Washington, and struggles to match the pace and assertiveness of bilateral U.S. diplomacy. Concerns persist in Brussels that U.S. dominance in Ukraine’s recovery may undermine inclusive European participation and strategic coherence.

China, meanwhile, pursues a dual-purpose strategy. On one hand, it retains dominance in global mineral processing, using this as leverage in response to Western trade restrictions and technology containment. On the other, according to Xu Qinduo, Beijing signals readiness to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction, positioning itself as the only actor capable of delivering large-scale infrastructure and industrial capacity. However, its alignment with Russia and perceived role in circumventing sanctions make its involvement politically contentious.

In short, countries’ approaches to Mineral Deal reflect their geopolitical priorities: U.S. securitization and exclusion, EU norm-driven multilateralism, and Chinese state-capitalist pragmatism. Ukraine thus finds itself at the intersection of competing agendas, each offering resources, but also embedding conditionalities reflective of broader strategic rivalries.

3. Mineral Diplomacy as a Fuel for Global Cooperation or Strategic Rivalry?

The issue. With technologies ranging from renewable energy systems to advanced weapons platforms relying heavily on rare earths and other strategic materials, mineral diplomacy now sits at the intersection of economic resilience, national security, and foreign policy.

As mineral diplomacy gains prominence, its frameworks increasingly reflect competitive and often exclusionary logics. Preferential investment rights, extraterritorial legal protections, and strategic export controls are becoming standard features of new agreements. These arrangements raise concerns about whether such deals promote mutual development and supply diversification—or whether they instead cement asymmetrical dependencies, restrict national policy space, and fragment global economic governance.

Analysis. The U.S.-Ukraine mineral agreement exemplifies a new pattern of resource diplomacy structured around geopolitical incentives. Article 8, mentioned by Kaiser Kuo, grants U.S.-based investors first-refusal rights on future mineral offtake and shields them from unfavorable legal changes. This signals a move toward investor-centered frameworks that may constrain Ukraine’s ability to diversify partners in the future. According to Ivan Us, while Ukrainian officials argue that these provisions are future-facing and legally manageable, the broader implication is clear: securing American resource flows is now tightly linked to preserving American influence.

Rather than building multilateral governance, such deals risk entrenching bilateral spheres of interest. As noted in the panel, the arrangement resembles historical practices of economic extraterritoriality more than modern principles of equitable development. It also sidelines the EU, whose preference is for sustainability-based investment grounded in regulatory norms. Brussels now faces the challenge of reasserting itself in a reconstruction process that increasingly appears shaped by bilateral deals outside its framework.

China’s approach adds a further layer of complexity. While Beijing has not directly opposed the U.S.-Ukraine deal, it remains cautious about resource-related exclusion. China’s dominance in mineral processing and its selective export restrictions—especially in the defense sector—signal a shift toward more explicit strategic use of supply chain leverage. As Xu Qinduo points out, there is growing awareness in China that overuse of export controls may backfire—undermining global goodwill and encouraging other countries to reduce their reliance on Chinese supply chains. Beijing’s careful messaging, particularly its emphasis on respecting national sovereignty and avoiding open confrontation with Europe or Ukraine, suggests a strategic effort to avoid being framed as an aggressor.

In general, mineral diplomacy is evolving not toward cooperation, but toward competitive alignment. Critical resources are being used not just to fuel economies, but to reinforce alliances, signal strategic commitments, and constrain adversaries. Without a coordinated international framework for transparency, equitable access, and dispute resolution, mineral diplomacy is more likely to deepen strategic rivalries than bridge them.

Policy Recommendations

1. Promote Better Coordination: Ukraine, the EU, and the U.S. should institutionalize dialogue on critical mineral governance to avoid fragmented or bilateral arrangements. A coordinated platform can help align investment priorities, avoid duplications, and safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty during post-war recovery.
2. Establish Transparent and Conditional Frameworks: Future mineral agreements should include clear legal safeguards—such as renegotiation clauses, transparent benefit-sharing mechanisms, and conditions linking resource access to concrete support (military, financial, or infrastructural).
3. Support Multilateral Norms in Mineral Diplomacy: All actors should work toward global rules for critical mineral trade, aligned with WTO principles. This includes ensuring fair access, preventing coercive export practices, and integrating smaller economies into global value chains.

This policy comment is the result of the first open discussion initiated by the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies (CSEEES) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, held on the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China. The event was co-organized in partnership with the Sinica Podcast, the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine), the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, and the A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.